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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Wylie Gail Hunter appeals from the summary dismissal of his successive petition
for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Hunter entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana preserving his
right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of
his September, 2007, traffic stop. State v. Hunter, No. 36728, 2011 WL 11037668 (Idaho
App. June 16, 2011). The Idaho Court of Appeals “conclud[ed] that the officers had
reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle based upon both the prior
investigation [of marijuana trafficking], as well as the traffic violations.” Id. at *3 n.2. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court. Id. at *10.
Hunter filed for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Hunter v. State, No. 41992, 2015 WL 3823828 (Idaho App. June 19, 2015). The district
court summarily dismissed the petition, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
Hunter then initiated the present case by filing a successive petition for postconviction relief. (R., pp. 14-23.) Hunter alleged that a DVD containing exculpatory
evidence had been withheld from him and eventually destroyed. (R., pp. 15-18.)
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition, asserting that the DVD was
not shown to be exculpatory and that its destruction was inadvertent, and therefore there
had been no due process violation. (R., pp. 297-301.) The state presented evidence that
the DVD had been created by the dash-cam of the trooper who conducted the traffic stop,
that the trooper had entered “no” in relation to whether the matter was a felony, and that
1

the DVD was destroyed in 2013 pursuant to existing ISP policies for destruction of
evidence in non-felony and non-fatality cases. (R., pp. 278, 512-17, 518-65.) Hunter
responded. (R., pp. 315-28.) He argued that not only had the state failed to produce the
DVD, it denied the existence of a DVD until after it was destroyed. (R., pp. 317-18.) This
argument was supported by evidence that Hunter had, in the criminal case, provided a
blanket discovery request for inspection of “books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, buildings, or places, or videos or copies or portions thereof,” and that
when defense counsel specifically asked about a video of the stop the prosecutor had
responded that there was no video of the stop. (R., pp. 168-69; Aug., p. 67 (Siebe
deposition Tr., p. 10, Ls. 6-17).)
The district court granted the motion for summary dismissal, concluding Hunter
had failed to provide admissible evidence of bad faith that would create a material issue of
fact. (R., p. 612; 3/2/18 Tr., p. 108, L. 3 – p. 113, L. 18.) Hunter filed a notice of appeal
that was perfected once the district court entered judgment. (R., pp. 616-23, 638.)
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ISSUES
Hunter states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Hunter’s
successive petition for post-conviction relief because he presented a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his due process rights
were violated?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Hunter’s
motion for a continuance?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Hunter failed to show that he presented admissible evidence to support a prima
facie claim of a due process violation?

2.

Has Hunter failed to show an abuse of discretion when the district court denied a
request for a continuance made after the matter had been submitted and in response
to the district court’s refusal to accept an untimely filing?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Hunter Has Failed To Show That He Presented Admissible Evidence To Support A
Prima Facie Claim Of A Due Process Violation
A.

Introduction
The district court determined that the state had failed to disclose a DVD containing

a video recording of the traffic stop before it was destroyed. (3/2/18 Tr., p. 109, Ls. 7-24.)
However, even taking all the facts in the light most favorable to Hunter, the district court
determined that, at most, the DVD “might have been exculpatory.” (3/2/18 Tr., p. 111, Ls.
2-19.) Thus, the proper legal standard was whether the DVD had been destroyed in bad
faith. (3/2/18 Tr., p. 111, Ls. 20-23.) The district court concluded that Hunter “failed to
provide admissible evidence that constitutes bad faith.” (3/2/18 Tr., p. 110, Ls. 17-18; see
also p. 111, Ls. 23-24; p. 113, Ls. 12-18.)
On appeal Hunter asserts that he did establish a prima facie case that the DVD was
exculpatory (and therefore the failure to disclose it was a violation independent of its
destruction) and that the destruction was in bad faith. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-15.) His
argument does not withstand scrutiny. Application of the correct legal standards to the
record in this case shows no error by the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on
file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).
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C.

Hunter Has Failed To Show That He Presented Admissible Evidence To Establish
A Prima Facie Claim Of A Due Process Violation
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new
and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing
that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v.
Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the
applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Until controverted by the state, allegations
in a verified post-conviction application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold
an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187,
1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions
of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125
Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). Further, allegations contained in a
post-conviction petition are insufficient for granting relief when they are clearly disproved
by the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903,
174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).
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Application of these standards shows that Hunter failed to present admissible
evidence showing a viable claim that his due process rights were violated by either the
failure to disclose or the destruction of the DVD.
1.

Hunter Did Not Present Evidence To Show A Brady Violation

“The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963),] that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused, upon
request, violates due process where the evidence is material to either the guilt or
punishment of the accused, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
Thumm v. State, No. 45290, 2019 WL 848061, at *14 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2019). See also
State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000) (“A defendant’s due
process rights are violated where the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence that
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”). “Evidence is material for purposes of a due process analysis if there is a
reasonable probability that disclosure of the undisclosed evidence would have resulted in
a different outcome in the proceeding.” Thumm, 2019 WL 848061, at *14. See also State
v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 503, 399 P.3d 804, 830 (2017) (“‘Reasonable probability of a
different result is shown when the suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of
the trial.” (internal quotation omitted)).
In order to prevail on a Brady claim, therefore, a petitioner must show three things:
“The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,
or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744,
830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1128 (2018) (internal quotation omitted). See
also ------Lankford, 162
- ---
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Idaho at 503, 399 P.3d at 830 (“In order to establish a Brady violation, there must be
evidence that (1) is favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching;
(2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) was prejudicial or
material in that there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the accused would
have led to a different result.”).
Although the evidence shows the DVD was “suppressed” (in the sense that it was
not disclosed to the defense), and thus meets the second prong of the Brady test, Hunter
presented no evidence of the first or third prongs. Initially, there is no evidence by which
the trial court could conclude that the DVD was exculpatory. Hunter’s only argument that
the DVD was exculpatory is his unsupported assertion that it would have supported his
claims of events surrounding the traffic stop and ultimate search of his car and impeached
the officers’ testimony. As found by the district court, at best the DVD may be found to
have been potentially exculpatory. (3/2/18 Tr., p. 111, Ls. 3-9.) Moreover, Hunter
presented no evidence he was prejudiced in the sense that his proceedings would have come
out differently. 1 Again, that it potentially impeached the officers is not a prima facie claim
that it would have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing. Moreover, because the
stop was also justified by reasonable suspicion of marijuana trafficking developed before
the events depicted in the video, the DVD could not conceivably have led to a different

1

For purposes of this argument the state will assume that Brady applies to evidence that
would have led to granting of a suppression motion. But see Hall, 163 Idaho at 831, 419
P.3d at 1129 (evidence subject to Brady only where it “would be of sufficient significance
to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial” (emphasis added)); State v.
Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 87, 952 P.2d 402, 409 (Ct. App. 1998) (evidence not subject to
Brady analysis where it has “no relevance” to the question of guilt).
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result. Because the contents of the video are unknown, Hunter’s claim fails on the first and
third prongs of a Brady claim.
Hunter argues that he did not have to show that the DVD contained exculpatory
evidence, only that what was on the DVD was known to the officer, and that he can meet
the prejudice prong of the test by showing that he “could not effectively dispute the
officers’ testimony at the suppression hearing.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) Hunter’s
argument is simply a misstatement of the applicable law, which requires that he establish
both that the DVD was exculpatory and a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the
accused would have led to a different result. Thumm, 2019 WL 848061, at *14; Hall, 163
Idaho at 830, 419 P.3d at 1128; Lankford, 162 Idaho at 503, 399 P.3d at 830. He cannot
meet his burden of showing that the DVD was exculpatory and material by merely claiming
that the officer who recorded the events in question presumably knew what was on the
recording, because that merely begs the question. If the DVD would in fact have backed
up the officers’ factual claims regarding the stop and search then it was not exculpatory
and would not have changed the outcome of the suppression hearing. Hunter’s argument
that he does not have to prove two of the three elements of a Brady claim is meritless.
Because Hunter advocates an erroneous legal standard rather than the one that
actually applies to his claim, he has failed to show error by the district court.
2.

Hunter Did Not Present Evidence Of A Youngblood Violation

“The government’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defendant
in a criminal case includes the duty to use earnest efforts to preserve evidence for possible
use by the defense.” Nelson v. State, 157 Idaho 847, 856, 340 P.3d 1163, 1172 (Ct. App.
2014).

“This constitutional obligation to preserve evidence is limited, however, to
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evidence that possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed and is of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by any other reasonably available means.” Id. (citing California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). Where the evidence is of unknown exculpatory value, “a due
process violation will be established only if the defendant shows that the government acted
in bad faith.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)). “Bad faith is
more than mere negligence” and “refers to a calculated effort to circumvent” the duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence. State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 67, 156 P.3d 565, 568 (2007).
“While the state has a duty to use earnest efforts to preserve evidence for possible use by a
defendant, the state does not have a general duty to gather evidence for the accused.” State
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 375, 707 P.2d 484, 486 (Ct. App. 1985).
The state presented evidence that the destruction of the DVD was the result of how
the evidence was coded in the evidence tracking system. (R., pp. 278, 512-17, 518-65.)
Specifically, the DVD had not been coded as related to a felony or a fatality, and was
destroyed about six years later in compliance with ISP policies for destroying evidence in
non-felony and non-fatality matters. (R., pp. 523-25.) The district court concluded Hunter
had failed to provide admissible evidence of bad faith that would create a material issue of
fact. (R., p. 612; 3/2/18 Tr., p. 108, L. 3 – p. 113, L. 18.) Because the only evidence in the
record shows that the destruction of the evidence was through inadvertence, the district
court properly granted summary dismissal of the Youngblood claim.
On appeal Hunter first argues that ISP did not follow their protocols on destruction
of evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14.) This argument is contrary to the record.
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ISP protocols call for retention of video evidence for five years, after which it may
be destroyed, unless the matter is designated as a felony or fatal event, in which case the
evidence is permanently retained. (R., p. 524; see also R., p. 533.) The DVD at issue was
not designated as a felony or a fatality on the evidence log. (R., p. 525; see also R., pp.
512-13.) It was destroyed in the regular course of business because it was over five years
old. (R., p. 525; see also R., p. 547.) The only evidence Hunter cites in support of his
argument is another entry on the same log showing a charge of “Felony trafficking MJ.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (citing R., p. 25).) He cites nothing indicating that this entry would
or should have been cross-checked prior to destruction of the DVD. The one entry on the
log pointed out by Hunter did not create a material issue of fact regarding whether ISP
followed its protocol. The destruction of the evidence was because of an erroneous log
entry that the video did not relate to a felony.
Hunter next argues that bad faith may be inferred from the fact that the destruction
of the DVD occurred during the pendency of his first petition for post-conviction relief.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) In his affidavit, Hunter asserted that the destruction happened
“about the time that the court granted permission for the depositions [of defense attorneys]
in the [first] post-conviction case.” (Aug., p. 7.) However, the evidence is that the DVD
was destroyed as part of routine procedure. (R., pp. 523-25.) Hunter’s speculation that the
DVD was destroyed as a response to taking depositions of defense counsel does not create
an issue of material fact.
Finally, Hunter argues he is entitled to an inference of bad faith from the fact of
destruction alone. (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) This argument is contrary to the above-cited
authority holding that it is his burden of proving bad faith.
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The evidence in this case shows that the DVD was destroyed as part of a routine
procedure, and the mistake leading to its destruction was the erroneous entry of “no”
regarding whether the DVD related to a felony. The district court therefore correctly
granted summary disposition.

II.
Hunter Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Declined
To Continue Proceedings
A.

Introduction
The state moved for summary disposition on November 9, 2016. (R., p. 297.)

Hunter filed a response on November 23, 2016. (R., p. 315.) The first hearing on the
motion, scheduled for February 16, 2017, was vacated. (R., p. 7.) The hearing was
rescheduled for April 24, 2017. (R., p. 7.) This hearing was then also vacated. (R., p. 8.)
The motion was set for hearing again, this time for June 21, 2017. (R., p. 9.) The hearing
was again vacated. (R., p. 9.) The hearing was rescheduled for August 14, 2017, and then
again for August 28, 2017. (R., p. 10.) This hearing was vacated and rescheduled for
October 25, 2017. (R., p. 11.) On October 25, 2017, the hearing was yet again vacated,
and rescheduled for February 7, 2018. (R., pp. 10-12.) This hearing was continued to
March 2, 2018. (R., p. 12.)
On March 2, 2018, the same day as the hearing, Hunter filed a second memorandum
in opposition to the motion for summary disposition. (R., p. 566.) Hunter attached
“evidence” he wanted to present to the district court with his untimely memorandum,
specifically police reports dated September 7, 2007 (R., pp. 580-86); an email sent to
Hunter’s attorney on November 20, 2017 (R., pp. 587-90); a letter to Hunter from trial
counsel dated February 8, 2011 (R., p. 591); more copies of police reports (R., pp. 59211

97); an email from a probation officer to Hunter’s counsel, dated October 10, 2016 (R., p.
598); an affidavit dated November 8, 2012, by Hunter from the prior post-conviction case
(R., pp. 599-601); an ISP property receipt dated October 19, 2007 (R., p. 603); a letter from
the Deputy Attorney General representing ISP dated April 10, 2017 (R., p. 604); an
affidavit dated October 21, 2008, from another of Hunter’s trial counsel (R., pp. 605-06);
and more copies of police reports (R., pp. 607-11).
At the hearing the district court stated that the memorandum was untimely, and
would not be considered. (3/2/18 Tr., p. 79, Ls. 20-25.) After the arguments were
presented to the district court, Hunter requested to be called to the stand “to make sure that
the documents that we want the Court to consider in determining this motion are in
evidence.” (3/2/18 Tr., p. 97, Ls. 20-23.) The district court considered this request a
“motion to present further evidence” and denied it as untimely. (3/2/18 Tr., p. 97, L. 24 –
p. 98, L. 15.) Hunter then made a request to “proceed pro se” because he “believes that
[counsel’s] failure to get some of the items … attached to [the] memo in is ineffective.”
(3/2/18 Tr., p. 103, L. 22 – p. 104, L. 3.) The district court held that this request was
“untimely” because the arguments were complete and the record presented for resolution
of the motion. (3/2/18 Tr., p. 104, Ls. 4-12; ----see also 3/2/18 Tr., p. 106, Ls. 15-25.) The
district court recognized that Hunter had the right to represent himself “after this
proceeding.” (3/2/18 Tr., p. 104, Ls. 12-14.)
Hunter argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion because the
delay in submitting the memorandum and attachments was the fault of his attorney and he
had an interest in the untimely submitted matters being considered. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
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15-19.) Because the district court had discretion to deny a continuance designed to cure
an untimely filing, Hunter’s argument is without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
“A decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is vested in the sound

discretion of the trial court.” Gunter v. Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 24, 105
P.3d 676, 684 (2005). “When determining whether a decision represents an abuse of
discretion, this Court examines whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” In Interest of Doe, 164 Idaho 143, ___,
426 P.3d 1243, 1246 (2018) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).

C.

Hunter Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion
“[W]hen seeking a continuance under Rule 56(f), the moving party must do so in

good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant’s affidavits
and how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other
means, to rebut the movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Boise
Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 104, 294 P.3d 1111, 1116
(2013) (emphasis original, internal quotations, brackets, and ellipses omitted). 2 “[T]his
Court will not reverse unless the trial court’s denial of a requested continuance has resulted

2

The version of Rule 56(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure effective in 2013 provided
a continuance of the hearing on a motion for summary judgment could be granted if “the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s
opposition.” I.R.C.P. 56(f) (2013).
13

in prejudice to the moving party.” Doe v. Doe, 149 Idaho 392, 398, 234 P.3d 716, 722
(2010).
Hunter failed to show that delay in filing his memorandum submitting this
information to the district court was reasonable. The motion was pending for 16 months,
and the hearing continued several times. The documents attached to the memorandum
were in Hunter’s possession for at least 14 weeks and, in some instances, years. Counsel’s
excuse of computer issues does not come close to explaining why the documents attached
to the memorandum were not submitted weeks earlier. The district court did not abuse its
discretion by not excusing the untimely filing, and therefore did not abuse its discretion by
denying a continuance designed to “cure” the untimely filing.
Moreover, Hunter also failed to show that any of the documentation was admissible
evidence. He presented no affidavits and no foundation; he merely attached documents to
a memorandum and made arguments. He also failed to establish the relevance of the
documents to the claim that the DVD had been destroyed in bad faith. Finally, many of
the documents were already before the court or related to facts that were not challenged.
The record supports no inference that Hunter was prejudiced by the denial of the requested
continuance.
Hunter first argues that because the case centers on the state’s failure to provide the
ultimately destroyed DVD he should be excused from timeliness requirements.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) This argument should not be considered as it is unsupported by
authority. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues
on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not
be considered.”). The state is unaware of any rule that allows a plaintiff to claim that,
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because the defendant allegedly engaged in tortious or other bad conduct, the plaintiff
alleging and trying to prove such wrongful conduct is exempt from procedural rules. The
state is quite certain that no court would allow it to ignore procedural deadlines merely
because it alleges the defendant is a rapist, a murderer, or even a marijuana trafficker.
Hunter further argues that his “interest in getting a continuance was very high”
because he will not be able to claim his post-conviction counsel was ineffective.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) This argument should not be considered as it is unsupported
by authority. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. The state submits that a party
may not force a continuance on the court merely by filing late and blaming it on counsel.
Hunter has shown no abuse of discretion and no prejudice. He has therefore failed
to show reversible error for denying his motion for a continuance and self-representation,
made after the summary dismissal motion was submitted to the district court for decision.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
summarily dismissing Hunter’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of March, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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